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ABSTRACT
The Madry Lab recently hosted a competition designed to test the robustness of
their adversarially trained MNIST model. Attacks were constrained to perturb each
pixel of the input image by a scaled maximal L∞ distortion  = 0.3. This decision
discourages the use of attacks which are not optimized on the L∞ distortion metric.
Our experimental results demonstrate that by relaxing the L∞ constraint of the
competition, the elastic-net attack to deep neural networks (EAD) can generate
transferable adversarial examples which, despite their high average L∞ distortion,
have minimal visual distortion. These results call into question the use of L∞ as a
sole measure for visual distortion, and further demonstrate the power of EAD at
generating robust adversarial examples.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve state-of-the-art performance in various tasks in machine
learning and artificial intelligence, such as image classification, speech recognition, machine transla-
tion and game-playing. Despite their effectiveness, recent studies have illustrated the vulnerability
of DNNs to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015). For instance, a
carefully designed perturbation to an image can lead a well-trained DNN to misclassify. Even worse,
effective adversarial examples can also be made virtually indistinguishable to human perception.
Adversarial examples crafted to evade a specific model can even be used to mislead other models
trained for the same task, exhibiting a property known as transferability.
To address this problem, the adversarial robustness of neural networks was studied through the lens
of robust optimization in (Madry et al., 2017), leading to an adversarially robust model for image
classification we term as the “Madry Defense Model”. An attack challenge1 was proposed for the
MNIST dataset to test the defense, however, attacks were constrained to perturb each pixel by at most
 = 0.3, a scaled maximal L∞ distortion. This rule greatly reduces the power of attacks which are not
optimized for the L∞ distortion metric, and imposes an unrealistic constraint on the attacker.
To justify the limitation of the L∞ constraint, we conduct extensive experiments on the Madry
Defense Model to investigate the transferability properties of the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks
without the L∞ constraint. We find that L1-based adversarial examples generated by EAD, which
is short for Elastic-net Attack to DNNs (Chen et al., 2017), readily transfer in both the targeted
and non-targeted cases, and despite the high L∞ distortion, the visual distortion on the adversarial
examples is minimal. These results call into question the use of L∞ to quantify visual distortion, and
further demonstrate the state-of-the-art transferability properties of EAD.
2 EXPERIMENT SETUP
The Madry Defense Model is a sufficiently high capacity network trained against the strongest
possible adversary, which they deem to be Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) starting from random
perturbations around the natural examples (Madry et al., 2017). We evaluate using the MNIST model,
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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Table 1: Comparison of tuned PGD, I-FGM, C&W, and EAD adversarial examples at various
confidence levels. ASR means attack success rate (%). The distortion metrics are averaged over
successful examples.
Targeted Non-Targeted
Attack Method Confidence ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞
PGD None 68.5 188.3 8.947 0.6 99.9 270.5 13.27 0.8
I-FGM None 75.1 144.5 7.406 0.915 99.8 199.4 10.66 0.9
C&W
10 1.1 34.15 2.482 0.548 4.9 23.23 1.702 0.424
30 69.4 68.14 4.864 0.871 71.3 51.04 3.698 0.756
50 92.9 117.45 8.041 0.987 99.1 78.65 5.598 0.937
70 34.8 169.7 10.88 0.994 99 119.4 8.097 0.99
EAD
10 27.4 25.79 3.209 0.876 39.9 19.19 2.636 0.8
30 85.8 49.64 5.179 0.995 94.5 34.28 4.192 0.971
50 98.5 93.46 7.711 1 99.6 57.68 5.839 0.999
70 67.2 148.9 10.36 1 99.8 90.84 7.719 1
as generating visually imperceptible adversarial examples using this dataset is difficult due to its
simple, grayscale nature. If this attack objective can be achieved, our methodology can be applied
to more realistic, color datasets, like CIFAR-10 and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009). For the MNIST
model, 40 iterations of PGD were run, with a step size of 0.01. Gradient steps were taken in the
L∞ norm. The network was trained and evaluated against perturbations of size no greater than  =
0.3. We experimentally show in the supplementary material that this is the maximum  for which the
Madry Defense Model can be successfully adversarially trained.
We test the transferability properties of attacks in both the targeted case and non-targeted case against
the adversarially trained model. We test the ability for attacks to generate transferable adversarial
examples using a single undefended model as well as an ensemble of undefended models, where
the ensemble size is set to 3. We expect that if an adversarial example remains adversarial to
multiple models, it is more likely to transfer to other unseen models (Liu et al., 2016; Papernot
et al., 2016). We discuss results transferring from an ensemble in the following sections, and provide
results transferring from a single undefended model in the supplementary material. The undefended
models we use are naturally trained networks of the same architecture as the defended model; the
architecture was provided in the competition. For generating adversarial examples, we compare the
optimization-based approach and the fast gradient-based approach using EAD and PGD, respectively.
EAD generalizes the state-of-the-art C&W L2 attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) by performing
elastic-net regularization, linearly combining the L1 and L2 penalty functions (Chen et al., 2017).
The hyperparameter β controls the trade-off between L1 and L2 minimization. We test EAD in
both the general case and the special case where β is set to 0, which is equivalent to the C&W L2
attack. We tune the κ “confidence” hyperparameter, which controls the necessary margin between
the predicted probability of the target class and that of the rest, in our experiments. Full detail on the
implementation is provided in the supplementary material.
For L∞ attacks, which we will consider, fast gradient methods (FGM) use the sign of the gradient∇J
of the training loss J with respect to the input for crafting adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al.,
2015). Iterative fast gradient methods (I-FGM) iteratively use FGM with a finer distortion, followed
by an -ball clipping (Kurakin et al., 2016). We note that this is essentially projected gradient descent
on the negative loss function. We test PGD both with and without random starts, and as the classic
I-FGM formulation does not include random starts, PGD without random starts shall be termed
I-FGM for the remainder of the paper. We perform grid search to tune , which controls the allowable
L∞ distortion. Full detail on the implementation is provided in the supplementary material.
3 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In our experiment, 1000 random samples from the MNIST test set were used. For the targeted case, a
target class that is different from the original one was randomly selected for each input image. The
results of the β tuning for EAD is provided in the supplementary material. It is observed that the
highest attack success rate (ASR) in both the targeted and non-targeted cases was yielded at β =
0.01. This was in fact the largest β tested, indicating the importance of minimizing the L1 distortion
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for generating transferable adversarial examples. Furthermore, as can be seen in the supplementary
material, the improvement in ASR with increasing β is more significant at lower κ, indicating the
importance of minimizing the L1 distortion for generating transferable adversarial examples with
minimal visual distortion. For PGD and I-FGM,  was tuned from 0.1 to 1.0 at 0.1 increments, full
results of which are provided in the supplementary material.
In Table 1, the results for tuning κ for C&W and EAD at β = 0.01 are provided, and are presented
with the results for PGD and I-FGM at the lowest  values at which the highest ASR was yielded, for
comparison. It is observed that in both the targeted case and the non-targeted case, EAD outperforms
C&W at all κ. Furthermore, in the targeted case, at the optimal κ = 50, EAD’s adversarial examples
surprisingly have lower average L2 distortion.
In the targeted case, EAD outperforms PGD and I-FGM at κ = 30 with much lower L1 and L2
distortion. In the non-targeted case, PGD and I-FGM yield similar ASR at lower L∞ distortion.
However, we argue that in the latter case the drastic increase in induced L1 and L2 distortion of PGD
and I-FGM to generate said adversarial examples indicates greater visual distortion, and thus that the
generated examples are less adversarial in nature. We examine this claim in the following section.
4 VISUAL COMPARISON
Adversarial examples generated by EAD and PGD were analyzed in the non-targeted case, to
understand if the successful examples are visually adversarial. A similar analysis in the targeted case
is provided in the supplementary material. We find that adversarial examples generated by PGD even
at low  such as 0.3, at which the attack performance is weak, have visually apparent noise.
Figure 1: Visual illustration of adversarial examples crafted in the non-targeted case by EAD and
PGD with similar average L∞ distortion.
.
In Figure 1, adversarial examples generated by EAD are directly compared to those generated by
PGD with similar average L∞ distortion. EAD tuned to the optimal β (0.01) was used to generate
adversarial examples with κ = 10. As can be seen in Table 1, the average L∞ distortion under
this configuration is 0.8. Therefore, adversarial examples were generated by PGD with  = 0.8.
Clearly, performing elastic-net minimization aids in minimizing visual distortion, even when the
L∞ distortion is large. Furthermore, these results also emphasize the issues in solely using L∞ to
measure visual distortion, and how setting such a distortion constraint for adversarial training is not
sufficient for characterizing the subspaces of visually similar adversarial examples.
5 CONCLUSION
The Madry Lab developed a defense model by focusing on training a sufficiently high-capacity
network and using the strongest possible adversary. By their estimations, this adversary was PGD,
which they motivate as the strongest attack utilizing the local first-order information about the
network. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that EAD is able to outperform PGD
in transferring in the targeted case. We also show that EAD is able to generate much less visually
distorted transferable adversarial examples than PGD with comparable L∞ distortion, due to the
drastic reduction in L1 and L2 distortion. These results demonstrate the power of EAD, particularly
in its transferability capabilities. Furthermore, these results indicate the drawbacks of using L∞ as
the sole distortion metric, and suggest incorporating L1 or L2 to complement the subspace analysis
of adversarial examples for possible defenses such as adversarial training and adversary detection.
3
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6 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
6.1 RETRAINING THE MADRY DEFENSE MODEL (TABLE 2)
The MNIST model released by the Madry Lab is adversarially trained using PGD with  = 0.3.
Therefore, it is expected that the existing Madry Defense Model performs poorly against PGD attacks
with  > 0.3.
In order to rectify this issue, the Madry Defense Model was trained with and evaluated against a PGD
adversary with  tuned from 0.1 to 1.0 under 0.1 increments. As suggested in (Madry et al., 2017),
the PGD attack was run for 40 iterations, and to account for varying , the stepsize was set to 2/40.
The adversarial retraining results are shown in Table 2. These results suggest that the Madry Defense
Model can not be successfully adversarially trained using a PGD adversary with  > 0.3. This is
understandable as with such large , the visual distortion is clearly perceptible.
6.2 ATTACK DETAILS
The targeted attack formulations are discussed below, non-targeted attacks can be implemented in
a similar fashion. We denote by x0 and x the original and adversarial examples, respectively, and
denote by t the target class to attack.
6.2.1 EAD
EAD generalizes the state-of-the-art C&W L2 attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) by performing elastic-
net regularization, linearly combining the L1 and L2 penalty functions (Chen et al., 2017). The
formulation is as follows:
minimizex c · f(x, t) + β‖x− x0‖1 + ‖x− x0‖22
subject to x ∈ [0, 1]p, (1)
where f(x, t) is defined as:
f(x, t) = max{max
j 6=t
[Logit(x)]j − [Logit(x)]t,−κ}, (2)
By increasing β, one trades off L2 minimization for L1 minimization. When β is set to 0, EAD is
equivalent to the C&W L2 attack. By increasing κ, one increases the necessary margin between
the predicted probability of the target class and that of the rest. Therefore, increasing κ improves
transferability but compromises visual quality.
We implement 9 binary search steps on the regularization parameter c (starting from 0.001) and run
I = 1000 iterations for each step with the initial learning rate α0 = 0.01. For finding successful
adversarial examples, we use the ADAM optimizer for the C&W attack and implement the projected
FISTA algorithm with the square-root decaying learning rate for EAD (Kingma & Ba, 2014; Beck &
Teboulle, 2009).
6.2.2 PGD
Fast gradient methods (FGM) use the gradient ∇J of the training loss J with respect to x0 for
crafting adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015). For L∞ attacks, which we will consider, x
is crafted by
x = x0 −  · sign(∇J(x0, t)), (3)
where  specifies the L∞ distortion between x and x0, and sign(∇J) takes the sign of the gradient.
Iterative fast gradient methods (I-FGM) were proposed in (Kurakin et al., 2016), which iteratively use
FGM with a finer distortion, followed by an -ball clipping. We note that this is essentially projected
gradient descent on the negative loss function.
Consistent with the implementation in (Madry et al., 2017), 40 steps were used. For PGD without
random starts, or I-FGM, the step size was set to be /40, which has been shown to be an effective
attack setting in (Tramèr et al., 2017). For PGD with random starts, the step size was set to be 2/40
in order to allow all pixels to reach all possible values.
5
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6.3 PGD ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES (FIGURE 2)
In Figure 2, a selected instance (a hand-written ‘1’) of adversarial examples crafted by PGD at 
tuned from 0.1 to 1.0 at 0.1 increments is shown. As PGD simply operates on a L∞ distortion budget,
as  increases, the amount of noise induced to all of the pixels in the image increases. This noise is
visually obvious even at low  such as 0.3, where the adversarial example does not even successfully
transfer. At higher  values, PGD appears to change the ‘1’ to a ‘3’. However, under such large visual
distortion, it is not entirely clear.
6.4 VISUAL COMPARISON IN THE TARGETED CASE (FIGURE 3)
In Figure 3, adversarial examples generated by EAD are directly compared to those generated by
PGD with similar average L∞ distortion in the targeted case. Adversarial examples generated by
EAD tuned to the optimal β (0.01) at κ = 10 have an average L∞ distortion of 0.876. Therefore,
these examples were compared to those generated by PGD with  = 0.8 and  = 0.9. It can be seen
that further distortion is needed to generate transferable adversarial examples in the targeted case,
however, the benefit that elastic-net minimization applies for improving visual quality is still clearly
evident.
6.5 SINGLE MODEL RESULTS (TABLE 3)
In Table 3, the results of tuning κ for C&W and EAD at the optimal β (0.01) are provided, and are
presented with the results for PGD and I-FGM at the lowest  where the highest ASR was yielded,
for comparison. Alike the results obtained when using an ensemble of models, it is observed that
EAD outperforms C&W at all κ. In the targeted case, at κ = 50, both EAD and C&W outperform
PGD and I-FGM with much lower L1 and L2 distortion. Furthermore, at κ ≥ 50, EAD’s adversarial
examples unexpectedly have lower average L2 distortion than C&W’s. In the non-targeted case, PGD
and I-FGM outperform EAD in terms of ASR. However, as can be inferred by the large L1 and L2
distortion, the perturbations are visually perceptible.
6.6 BETA SEARCH FOR EAD (TABLES 4 AND 5)
In Table 4, the results of tuning β when generating adversarial examples with EAD attacking an
ensemble of models are presented. In Table 5, the results of tuning β when generating adversarial
examples with EAD attacking a single model are presented. In both cases, one can see that at the
optimal κ in terms of ASR, tuning β plays relatively little effect in improving the ASR. However, at
lower κ, which is applicable when visual quality is important, increasing β plays a rather significant
role in improving the ASR. This suggests that for generating transferable adversarial examples with
minimal visual distortion, minimizing the L1 distortion is more important than minimizing L2, or, by
extension, L∞.
6.7 EPSILON SEARCH FOR PGD AND I-FGM (FIGURES 4 AND 5)
In Figure 4, the results of tuning  when generating adversarial examples with PGD and I-FGM
attacking an ensemble of models are shown. In Figure 5, the results of tuning  when generating
adversarial examples with PGD and I-FGM attacking a single model are shown. The results simply
show that by adding large amounts of visual distortion to the original image, an attacker can cause a
target defense model to misclassify. However, when compared to EAD, the adversarial examples
of PGD and I-FGM are less transferable and, when successful, the perturbations are more visually
perceptible, as indicated by the drastic increase in the L1 and L2 distortion at high .
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Table 2: Results of training the Madry Defense Model with a PGD adversary constrained under
varying . ‘Nat Test Accuracy’ denotes accuracy on classifying original images. ‘Adv Test Accuracy’
denotes accuracy on classifying adversarial images generated by the same PGD adversary as was
used for training.
Epsilon Nat Test Accuracy Adv Test Accuracy
0.1 99.38 95.53
0.2 99 92.65
0.3 98.16 91.14
0.4 11.35 11.35
0.5 11.35 11.35
0.6 11.35 11.35
0.7 10.28 10.28
0.8 11.35 11.35
0.9 11.35 11.35
1 11.35 11.35
Figure 2: Visual illustration of adversarial examples crafted by PGD with  tuned from 0.1 to 1.0 at
0.1 increments. The leftmost image is the original example. With  ≤ 0.3, the adversarial examples
were unsuccessful at transferring to the Madry Defense Model.
.
Figure 3: Visual illustration of adversarial examples crafted in the targeted case by EAD and PGD
with similar average L∞ distortion. As the adversarial examples generated by EAD have an average
L∞ distortion of 0.876, adversarial examples generated by PGD with  = 0.8 and  = 0.9 are shown.
.
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Table 3: Comparison of tuned PGD, I-FGM, C&W, and EAD adversarial examples at various
confidence levels generated from attacking a single model. ASR means attack success rate (%). The
distortion metrics are averaged over successful examples.
Targeted Non-Targeted
Attack Method Confidence ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞
PGD None 41.2 214.5 10.18 0.7 99.7 237.1 11.52 0.7
I-FGM None 39.2 133.6 6.801 0.87 99.3 160.8 8.395 0.7
C&W
10 0.1 17.4 1.112 0.19 1.8 12.57 0.801 0.156
30 4.8 47.9 3.235 0.69 8.5 35.5 2.371 0.53
50 51.5 81.67 5.455 0.913 46.9 59.18 3.873 0.765
70 75.8 114.6 7.499 0.986 89.7 82.85 5.375 0.925
EAD
10 3.6 13.21 2.22 0.848 11.8 10.91 1.856 0.725
30 32.7 33.75 3.735 0.963 44.9 25.98 3.129 0.906
50 67.2 59.05 5.404 0.998 81 41.89 4.319 0.978
70 82.7 91.15 7.227 1 94.7 61.69 5.572 0.997
Table 4: Analysis of adversarial examples generated by EAD tuned with various beta values and
confidence levels when attacking an ensemble of models. ASR means attack success rate (%). The
distortion metrics are averaged over successful examples.
Targeted Non-Targeted
Beta Confidence ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞
1e-4
10 1.4 31.67 2.435 0.614 5.7 23.52 1.795 0.487
30 67.5 64.84 4.526 0.894 71 50.58 3.641 0.812
50 98.7 107.3 7.094 0.997 98.9 76.68 5.361 0.965
70 74.3 163.6 9.993 1 99.8 112.9 7.466 0.998
1e-3
10 4.8 26.31 2.489 0.701 14.1 20.71 2.087 0.622
30 75.5 59.62 4.642 0.941 83.5 43.16 3.69 0.871
50 98.6 99.98 7.185 0.999 99.3 69.56 5.411 0.979
70 73 155.2 10 1 99.8 106.4 7.526 0.999
1e-2
10 27.4 25.79 3.209 0.876 39.9 19.19 2.636 0.8
30 85.8 49.64 5.179 0.995 94.5 34.28 4.192 0.971
50 98.5 93.46 7.711 1 99.6 57.68 5.839 0.999
70 67.2 148.9 10.36 1 99.8 90.84 7.719 1
Table 5: Analysis of adversarial examples generated by EAD tuned with various beta values and
confidence levels when attacking a single model. ASR means attack success rate (%). The distortion
metrics are averaged over successful examples.
Targeted Non-Targeted
Beta Confidence ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞
1e-4
10 0.1 16.03 1.102 0.186 2 12.68 0.867 0.193
30 2.8 43.02 2.88 0.658 9.8 34.21 2.33 0.558
50 36.8 75.5 4.76 0.891 41.8 58.06 3.723 0.773
70 75.1 107.7 6.629 0.988 84.6 81.18 5.063 0.924
1e-3
10 0.3 16.23 1.45 0.379 2.5 11.79 1.037 0.286
30 7.5 39.42 3.025 0.739 15.4 30.13 2.453 0.658
50 49.8 69.66 4.892 0.942 53.3 52.67 3.779 0.839
70 78 99.68 6.711 0.996 88 74.47 5.096 0.951
1e-2
10 3.6 13.21 2.22 0.848 11.8 10.91 1.856 0.725
30 32.7 33.75 3.735 0.963 44.9 25.98 3.129 0.906
50 67.2 59.05 5.404 0.998 81 41.89 4.319 0.978
70 82.7 91.15 7.227 1 94.7 61.69 5.572 0.997
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Figure 4: Attack transferability of adversarial examples generated by PGD and I-FGM with various 
values when attacking an ensemble of models.
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Figure 5: Attack transferability of adversarial examples generated by PGD and I-FGM with various 
values when attacking a single model.
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